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JURISDICTION 
Plaintiffs below alleged violations under section 309(d) and 
(b) of the Federal Water Pollution Control Act, 33 U.S.C. § 
1311(a). Plaintiff-Intervenor Riverwatcher intervened under 
section 505(b)(1)(B) of the Clean Water Act, alleging additional 
causes of action under section 7002 of the Resource Conservation 
and Recovery Act, 42 U.S.C. § 6972. The district court had federal 
question jurisdiction over these claims pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 
1331. Defendant counter-alleged common law trespass claims 
against Riverwatcher, over which the district court had 
supplemental jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1367(a). The 
district court’s final order dismissed the complaints, and 
Appellants filed a timely notice of appeal. Fed. R. App. P. 
4(a)(1)(A). This Court has appellate jurisdiction over all claims at 
issue under 28 U.S.C. § 1291. 
 
 
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES 
I.      Is the Queechunk Canal a public trust navigable water, 
making it unlawful for the Farm to close the Canal to public 
access? 
II.  Is evidence gathered via trespass onto the Farm’s 
property admissible in a civil enforcement proceeding under the 
Clean Water Act and the Resource Conservation and Recovery 
Act? 
III.  Is the Farm a concentrated animal feeding operation 
subject to Clean Water Act permitting for the discharge of 
manure and acid whey from its fields into waters of the United 
States? 
IV.  Even if the Farm is not a concentrated animal feeding 
operation, does its improper manure application remove the 
discharge from the Clean Water Act’s agricultural stormwater 
exemption and require a discharge permit? 
2https://digitalcommons.pace.edu/pelroc/vol6/iss1/4
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V.   Does the Farm’s practice of spreading acid whey onto its 
fields constitute open dumping in violation of the Resource 
Conservation and Recovery Act? 
VI. Could the Farm’s practice of spreading acid whey onto its 




STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
This appeal centers on regulating polluters as mandated by 
two federal environmental statutes. Failure to do so here has 
allowed pollutants to enter a city’s drinking water and threaten 
human health. The relevant facts are set forth below. 
The Deep Quod River and Queechunk Canal. The Deep 
Quod River flows year round and is navigable by small boat. R. at 
5. The City of Farmville in the State of New Union uses the Deep 
Quod as a source of drinking water. R. at 5. In the 1940s, the 
predecessor-in-interest of Moon Moo Farm, Inc. (the Farm) 
excavated the Queechunk Canal (the Canal) from the Deep Quod 
in order to reduce flooding on the property. R. at 5. This resulted 
in most of the Deep Quod’s flow diverting into the Canal. R. at 5. 
The Farm owns the land on both sides of the Canal, which can 
accommodate canoes or other small boats, and despite the Farm’s 
“No Trespassing” signs, is frequently used as a shortcut along the 
Deep Quod. R. at 5. 
Moon Moo Farm. The Farm is a dairy operation that 
maintains 350 cows and is located ten miles upstream from 
Farmville on the Deep Quod. R. at 4. The Farm sits on 150 acres 
of land used to grow Bermuda grass, and applies liquid manure 
as fertilizer for the grass. R. at 5. The manure is stored in an 
outdoor lagoon until the Farm uses tractors to spread it onto the 
land. R. at 5. Since 2012, the Farm has accepted acid whey, a 
byproduct of the yogurt production process, from the Chokos 
Greek Yogurt plant in Farmville, which the Farm adds to its 
outdoor lagoon and spreads onto the fields with the manure. R. at 
5. The acid whey makes the Bermuda grass less efficient at 
3
  
90 PACE ENVIRONMENTAL LAW REVIEW ONLINE [Vol.  6 
absorbing nutrients from the manure. R. at 6. During rain events, 
unabsorbed nutrients get washed off the fields through a 
drainage ditch connecting the Farm’s fields to the Canal, 
eventually reaching Farmville’s drinking water. R. at 6. 
The Farm’s NMP. Pursuant to its delegated authority under 
the CWA, New Union regulates the Farm as a “no-discharge” 
animal feeding operation. R. at 5. As such, the Farm has a 
Nutrient Management Plan (NMP) that sets out the rate at which 
the Farm may apply manure to its fields and details the expected 
uptake of nutrients by the Bermuda grass. R. at 5. This NMP has 
not been subject to any review. R. at 5. The Farm applied manure 
in accordance with its NMP, but its NMP may not account for 
mixing acid whey with manure or applying the mixture to the 
fields. R. at 6. 
Riverwatcher. Riverwatcher is a nonprofit environmental 
organization, and James oversees the Deep Quod on behalf of 
Riverwatcher. R. at 4. In the early spring of 2013, Riverwatcher 
received complaints that the Deep Quod smelled of manure and 
exhibited an unusual brown color. R. at 6. In response, James 
floated a small metal boat into the Canal to investigate. R. at 6. 
He observed and took pictures of the Farm spreading manure, 
and of discolored water flowing from the Farm’s drainage ditch 
into the Canal. R. at 6. James also took samples of the discolored 
water, which ultimately showed highly elevated levels of nitrates 
and fecal coliforms. R. at 6. 
The April 2013 Nitrate Advisory. Nitrogen in water can be 
hazardous. R. at 6. Following a rain event in April, 2013, the 
Farmville Water Authority issued a nitrate advisory, which 
warned its customers that the municipal water supply had 
become unsafe for drinking by infants. R. at 6. The Authority 
recommended that customers provide bottled water to infants 
under two years old. R. at 6. Riverwatcher’s environmental health 
expert believes that the Farm’s discharges contributed to the 
nitrate advisory, though she could not state whether the Farm 
was the but-for cause. R. at 7. 
Procedural History. Riverwatcher initiated this action 
against the Farm under the citizen suit provisions of the Clean 
Water Act (CWA) and the Resource Conservation and Recovery 
Act (RCRA). In response, the United States Environmental 
Protection Agency (EPA) filed a civil enforcement action under 
4https://digitalcommons.pace.edu/pelroc/vol6/iss1/4
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the CWA against the Farm, and Riverwatcher intervened as 
plaintiff with additional RCRA claims. The Farm counterclaimed 
against Riverwatcher for trespassing. The district court granted 
summary judgment in favor of the Farm on all claims, including 
the Farm’s counterclaim. 
Rulings Presented for Review. Riverwatcher disputes the 
district court’s finding that a trespass occurred when James 
collected evidence. Because James’s evidence is admissible 
regardless, Riverwatcher further appeals the court’s dismissal of 
the CWA claims because the Farm requires a permit under the 
National Pollution Discharge Elimination System (NPDES) as a 
point source. Riverwatcher also appeals the dismissal of its RCRA 
claims because the court failed to properly address whether the 
Farm’s practices constitute open dumping, and because the 
Farm’s practices may pose an imminent and substantial 
endangerment to human health. This Court granted review and 




SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT 
This Court should reverse the district court’s grant of 
summary judgment in favor of the Farm for the following 
reasons. First, the district court erred by holding that 
Riverwatcher’s evidence is inadmissible because James 
trespassed onto the Farm’s property to collect it. The court relied 
on inapposite federal law to determine that the Canal on which 
James floated to collect the evidence is not a public trust 
navigable water. Under proper public trust analysis, the Canal is 
a public trust waterway based on the minimum contours of the 
public trust doctrine. Further, even under the federal law relied 
on by the district court, the Farm may not close the Canal to 
public access. Under both state and federal law, James did not 
trespass, the evidence is admissible, and the Farm’s counterclaim 
fails. 
Second, the district court erred in excluding evidence simply 
because James allegedly trespassed to retrieve it. James, a 
5
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private actor, in no way violated the Farm’s Fourth Amendment 
protections from unreasonable government search and seizure. 
Even if he did, well-established case law dictates that such 
evidence should not be excluded. Accordingly, all relevant 
evidence in the case is admissible. 
Third, because the district court erroneously excluded 
evidence of the discharge, the Farm was never properly classified 
as a CAFO. All CAFOs, like the Farm, are point sources, and 
discharges from them are regulated under the CWA, especially 
when waste is improperly applied to the CAFO’s fields. The 
Farm’s discharge does not fall under any of the CWA’s 
stormwater exemptions. The Farm’s landspreading is part of the 
CAFO operations and is explicitly point source pollution. The 
Farm is also not exempt because even though the landspreading 
is in compliance with the Farm’s NMP, the NMP is improper and 
cannot serve as a shield to NPDES. Regardless of the Farm’s 
CAFO status, the Farm is subject to NPDES permit 
requirements. Given the field discharge, the district court failed 
to consider that the Farm’s discharge was ultimately not caused 
by precipitation. The discharge from the ditch violates the Farm’s 
status as a “no-discharge” operation, and the Farm will continue 
to discharge. Thus, the Farm requires an NPDES permit and is 
not subject to any agricultural stormwater exemption. 
Finally, the district court erroneously dismissed 
Riverwatcher’s RCRA claims. As for the open dumping claim, it 
held that the manure and acid whey do not constitute solid waste. 
It also held that, even if the materials are solid waste, EPA’s 
agricultural waste exemption excludes the Farm’s landspreading 
from being regulated as open dumping. With respect to the acid 
whey, the court erred in each of these findings. Once Chokos 
discards the whey, it constitutes a solid waste. The Farm cannot 
escape RCRA liability by simply mixing discarded material with 
its manure. Moreover, while the agricultural waste exemption 
might apply to the manure, it does not apply to the acid whey. 
Regarding Riverwatcher’s imminent and substantial 
endangerment claim, the district court applied the incorrect 
standards. The Farm need not be the but-for cause of the nitrate 
advisory, but needs only to have contributed to the problem that 
may lead to such advisories. Further, the fact that these 
advisories pose a risk to infants is sufficient to demonstrate that 
6https://digitalcommons.pace.edu/pelroc/vol6/iss1/4
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the Farm’s practices may present an imminent and substantial 
endangerment. For the foregoing reasons, Riverwatcher requests 
that this Court reverse the district court’s grant of summary 




STANDARD OF REVIEW 
To withstand a motion for summary judgment, the non-
moving party must show either that there is a genuine dispute as 
to any material fact or that the movant is not entitled to 
judgment as a matter of law. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a); Celotex 
Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322 (1986). On review of a granted 
motion for summary judgment, this Court reviews the district 
court’s decision de novo, viewing all evidence in the light most 
favorable to the non-moving party. United Fire & Cas. Co. v. 




I.    THE FARM CANNOT PROHIBIT ACCESS TO THE 
QUEECHUNK CANAL BECAUSE IT IS A 
PUBLICLY NAVIGABLE WATERWAY. 
Under proper public trust and navigational servitude 
analysis, this Court should reverse the district court’s 
exclusionary rule and trespass holdings. The district court 
misinterpreted and improperly relied on Kaiser Aetna v. United 
States, 444 U.S. 164 (1979) in holding that the Canal is not a 
public trust navigable waterway. Kaiser Aetna analyzed the 
applicability of the Commerce Clause federal navigational 
servitude, but never addressed the public trust doctrine. Id. at 
7
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169; see also Fish House, Inc. v. Clarke, 693 S.E.2d 208, 211 (N.C. 
Ct. App. 2010) (holding that Kaiser Aetna is “inapposite” to public 
trust navigability). While federal law determines if the public 
trust doctrine applies, State law determines the scope of the 
public trust. PPL Mont., LLC v. Montana, 132 S. Ct. 1215, 1227, 
1235 (2012). Below, proper public trust analysis will be applied to 
the Canal, followed by correct application of the Kaiser Aetna 
test. Under either rule, the Canal had to remain open to public 
access and James did not trespass. 
A. Under proper public trust analysis, the Canal is a 
public trust navigable water. 
1. Federal law mandates application of the public 
trust doctrine to New Union navigable waters 
despite the lack of New Union case law. 
The public trust doctrine exists through state ownership of 
the beds and banks of navigable waterways. The United States 
Constitution impliedly granted all states ownership in such 
submerged lands via the “equal footing” doctrine. See Pollard v. 
Hagan, 44 U.S. 212, 216 (1845). As such, waters navigable at the 
time of statehood are “held in trust for the people of the state, 
that they may enjoy navigation of the waters . . . .” Ill. Cent. R. 
Co. v. Illinois, 146 U.S. 387, 452 (1892). Importantly, this trust is 
irreducible—no state may completely eliminate public trust 
navigation rights. Id. at 453 (“The state can no more abdicate 
[this] trust . . . than it can abdicate its police powers . . . .”); see 
also Lawrence v. Clark County, 254 P.3d 606, 613 (Nev. 2011) 
(“The public trust doctrine is thus not simply common law easily 
abrogated by legislation; instead, the doctrine constitutes an 
inseverable restraint on the state’s sovereign power.” (emphasis 
added)). 
Under the irreducible contours of the public trust doctrine, 
federal law dictates that the doctrine must apply in the State of 
New Union. As a result, New Union waters navigable at the time 
of statehood cannot be closed to public navigation. The district 
court’s failure to even engage in analysis regarding this obligation 
represents reversible error, particularly because the Deep Quod 
and the Canal are public trust waterways, as shown below. 
8https://digitalcommons.pace.edu/pelroc/vol6/iss1/4
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2. The law and policy behind the public trust 
doctrine necessitate that the Deep Quod and the 
Canal remain open to the public. 
River segments, if not entire rivers, are subject to the public 
trust if they were navigable at the time of statehood in their 
natural condition. PPL Mont., 132 S. Ct. at 1228. Navigability at 
the time of statehood is a low threshold, typically determined by 
the river’s usefulness in “trade or travel” at the time, using water 
craft of that period. United States v. Utah, 283 U.S. 64, 76 (1931). 
Even log floatability constitutes usefulness in trade in several 
states. See, e.g., S. Idaho Fish & Game Ass’n v. Picabo Livestock, 
Inc., 528 P.2d 1295, 1297 (Idaho 1974). Furthermore, when a 
public trust river avulses, or suddenly changes course, the public 
trust generally remains with the newly formed waterway. See 
J.P. Furlong Enter., Inc. v. Sun Exploration & Prod. Co., 423 
N.W.2d 130, 140 (N.D. 1988) (holding that “the state’s title would 
follow the movement of the bed of the river” to accord with policy 
of public trust doctrine); Maufrais v. State, 180 S.W.2d 144, 149 
(Tex. 1944) (holding that state’s title follows avulsive deviations). 
This is particularly true when the avulsion is caused by a 
riparian owner. See Mentor Harbor Yachting Club v. Mentor 
Lagoons, Inc., 163 N.E.2d 373, 377 (Ohio 1959) (“A natural 
watercourse does not lose its character as a public watercourse 
because a part of its channel has been artificially created.”); 
Idaho Forest Indus., Inc. v. Hayden Lake Watershed Imp. Dist., 
733 P.2d 733, 738 (Idaho 1987). 
Navigability of the Deep Quod at the time of statehood 
presents at least a material issue of fact to be determined upon 
remand. However, the record suggests that the Deep Quod is a 
public trust waterway under the minimum obligations set out in 
United States v. Utah. The river is navigable by “small boat,” 
flows year round, and connects to the Mississippi River. R. at 5. 
Further, the Canal is “commonly used” as a shortcut up and down 
the Deep Quod, indicating that the river has long been traversed 
by boat. R. at 5. Presuming these same circumstances existed at 
New Union’s statehood, the Deep Quod is subject to the minimum 
requirements of the public trust. See PPL Mont., 132 S. Ct. at 
1233 (noting that although present day evidence of navigability is 
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The Farm’s predecessor-in-interest excavated a channel from 
the Deep Quod to create the Canal. R. at 5. This man-made 
avulsion caused “most of the flow of the Deep Quod” to divert into 
the Canal. R. at 5. As a result, under analysis the district court 
should have engaged in, the public trust followed the change in 
the river’s course, and the Canal became a public trust water just 
like the Deep Quod above and below it. Additionally, given that 
the Canal has existed for over fifty years and has been commonly 
used as a shortcut by the public, the Canal is the “functional 
equivalent” of a natural waterway, regardless of private 
ownership. See State ex rel. Medlock v. S.C. Coastal Council, 346 
S.E.2d 716, 718 (S.C. 1986); Fish House, Inc., 693 S.E.2d at 211–
12 (dismissing trespass claim because private ditch that had been 
publicly used for over twenty years was subject to public trust). 
Thus, the public trust followed the Deep Quod into the Canal, and 
the Farm is not entitled to close the Canal to public navigation as 
a matter of law. Along with the foregoing public trust law, sound 
policy supports this conclusion. 
Allowing the Farm or its predecessor to bypass public trust 
obligations by simply diverting the Deep Quod would effectively 
transform the public trust doctrine into an incentive to divert and 
destroy public waters. The ever-expanding policy to prevent the 
destruction of public trust waters dictates that such a holding is 
improper. Ever since Illinois Central, state courts have broadened 
the public trust doctrine to create or preserve public rights to 
navigation. Whether in expansion of the modern uses protected by 
the doctrine (see Robin Kundis Craig et al., Modern Water Law 
350 (2013) (listing 28 states that expressly recognize public 
recreation rights in navigable waters, as opposed to only four that 
do not)), or of which waters are subject to the public trust (see 
Nat’l Audubon Soc. v. Superior Court, 658 P.2d 709, 721 (Cal. 
1983) (applying public trust to non-navigable tributaries of 
navigable waters)), states have increasingly broadened the 
doctrine’s scope in order to protect access to navigable waters. 
The district court’s decision does the opposite. The court has 
invited riparian landowners to divert natural waterways in order 
to privatize public waters. Thus, not only did the court ignore the 
unmistakable trend toward expanding the public trust, it turned 
the policy of the public trust on its head. What ordinarily would 
prohibit destruction of navigable waterways would, in New 
10https://digitalcommons.pace.edu/pelroc/vol6/iss1/4
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Union, encourage such destruction. As such, this Court should 
reverse the decision of the district court to protect what is 
“traditionally the most important feature of the public trust 
doctrine”—the public right of navigability. J.P. Furlong Enter., 
Inc., 423 N.W.2d at 140. 
B.  Even under Kaiser Aetna, the Farm cannot prohibit 
public access to the Canal. 
If this Court upholds the district court’s reliance on Kaiser 
Aetna, the facts of this case necessitate the opposite holding. The 
federal navigational servitude analyzed in Kaiser Aetna, like the 
public trust doctrine, prohibits the Farm’s privatization of the 
Canal. In Kaiser Aetna, the Court did not to apply the servitude 
because first, Kuapa Pond was not the “sort of great navigable 
stream” ordinarily subject to the navigational servitude, and 
second, Kuapa Pond was privately owned before it was dredged. 
444 U.S. at 178–79 (quotations omitted). 
Both factors are absent in the Canal’s case. The Deep Quod is 
a publicly navigable river, and is consequently the “sort of great 
navigable stream” ordinarily protected by the federal 
navigational servitude. The Farm’s predecessor-in-interest 
created the Canal, diverting most of the flow of the Deep Quod 
onto its property for purposes of flood control. R. at 5. The record’s 
indication that the Deep Quod is commonly used for commerce, r. 
at 5, suggests it was not privately held before the Canal was 
created. Applying Kaiser Aetna’s reasoning, the federal 
navigational servitude followed the water into the Canal and 
neither the Farm nor its predecessor could prohibit public access 
to the Canal. 
The district court also did not consider that destruction of the 
Deep Quod’s navigability requires application of the navigational 
servitude to the Canal. In Vaughn v. Vermilion Corp., 444 U.S. 
206, 208–09 (1979), the Supreme Court held that “destruction of a 
pre-existing natural navigable waterway” by diversion onto 
private fast land may, if proven, mandate a public right of access 
along the diversion. Id. The record in this case suggests that at 
the point of diversion from the Canal the navigability of the Deep 
Quod is destroyed. See R. at 5 (stating that most of the flow of the 
Deep Quod flows through the Canal). At the very least, a 
determination of whether the Deep Quod’s navigability is 
11
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destroyed at the point of diversion presents a material issue of 
fact warranting remand. 
For the foregoing reasons, this Court should reverse and 
remand in favor of Riverwatcher and EPA, and dismiss the 
Farm’s common law trespass claim. Under either the proper 
public trust analysis or the district court’s reasoning, no trespass 
occurred because the Canal cannot be closed to public access. 
 
II.   NEITHER THE FOURTH AMENDMENT NOR THE 
EXCLUSIONARY RULE APPLIES TO JAMES’S 
EVIDENCE GATHERING. 
A.  The Fourth Amendment does not apply to James’s 
purely private actions. 
The Fourth Amendment protects citizens from unreasonable 
searches and seizures performed by government actors. See U.S. 
Const. amend. IV; Burdeau v. McDowell, 256 U.S. 465, 475 (1921) 
(“[The Fourth Amendment] was intended as a restraint upon the 
activities of sovereign authority, and was not intended to be a 
limitation upon other than governmental agencies . . . .”). Unless 
a private citizen “acted either at government direction or for the 
purpose of assisting the investigation,” there can be no Fourth 
Amendment violation. United States v. Billingsley, 440 F.2d 823, 
826 (7th Cir. 1971), cert. denied, 403 U.S. 909 (1971). 
James collected evidence in this case unilaterally as a private 
citizen. The record includes no evidence that he acted at 
government direction or for purposes of assisting a government 
investigation. James took the photographs and water samples in 
response to Riverwatcher’s receiving complaints that the river 
smelled of manure and was an unusual brown color. R. at 6. The 
government, whether EPA, Farmville, or New Union, did not act 
in the case until after James’s unilateral search,2 and after 
Riverwatcher served its letter of intent to sue. “And once a 
private search is completed, the subsequent involvement of 
 
 2. The Farmville Water Authority issued a “nitrate” advisory prior to 
James’s search, but the record does not indicate that James was directed by the 
Authority or investigated on its behalf. 
12https://digitalcommons.pace.edu/pelroc/vol6/iss1/4
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government agents does not retroactively transform the original 
intrusion into a governmental search.” United States v. Sherwin, 
539 F.2d 1, 6 (9th Cir. 1976). The Farm’s remedy for James’s 
alleged illegal search is not under the Fourth Amendment—it is 
under common law trespass, which the Farm contemplated in 
bringing its claim against James, rather than a government 
entity. The district court’s assumption that James acted on behalf 
of EPA is unsupported by the record, and is at least a disputed 
issue of fact. The district court further erred in awarding the 
Farm more than actual damages. See Walter E. Dellinger, Of 
Rights and Remedies: The Constitution as a Sword, 85 Harv. L. 
Rev. 1532, 1535 (1972) (noting that state tort remedies may be 
available for Fourth Amendment violations, but damages would 
be limited to “no more than repayment for a broken doorknob”). 
This Court should reverse the finding of government involvement 
and remand to reassess damages, if any. 
B.   James did not engage in an unreasonable search 
under the Fourth Amendment. 
The district court failed to address whether James actually 
engaged in a Fourth Amendment search. Had the court done so, it 
would not have reached the exclusionary rule issue because 
James did not engage in an unreasonable search of the Farm. The 
Fourth Amendment prohibits only “unreasonable searches and 
seizures” of citizens’ “persons, houses, papers, and effects.” U.S. 
Const. amend. IV (emphasis added). Unreasonable searches 
generally result in the suppression, or exclusion, of illegally 
seized evidence. United States v. Calandra, 414 U.S. 338, 347 
(1974). Searches become unreasonable only once legitimate 
expectations of individual privacy are infringed. See Oliver v. 
United States, 466 U.S. 170, 178 (1984). And importantly, “the 
general rights of property protected by the common law of 
trespass have little or no relevance to the applicability of the 
Fourth Amendment.” Id. at 183–84 (emphasis added). 
James allegedly engaged in two different kinds of 
“searches”—one in his observing and photographing the Farm’s 
landspreading and polluted effluent, and the other in sampling 
the polluted effluent. R. at 6. Neither of these activities 
constituted a Fourth Amendment search, and this Court should 
reverse the district court’s exclusion of Riverwatcher’s evidence. 
13
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1. The observations and photographs are 
admissible. 
James’s observation and photography of the Farm’s manure 
spreading did not infringe on legitimate expectations of privacy. 
The Fourth Amendment does not prohibit warrantless searches 
in agricultural fields because a property owner has no legitimate 
expectation of privacy in “open fields.” See Oliver, 466 U.S. at 177; 
see also Dow Chem. Co. v. United States, 476 U.S. 227, 234 (1986) 
(applying open fields doctrine to non-residential property). 
Further, any activity that the public could lawfully engage in 
without trespassing cannot constitute an unreasonable Fourth 
Amendment search. See Oliver, 466 U.S. at 179 (“It is not 
generally true that fences or ‘No Trespassing’ signs effectively bar 
the public from viewing open fields in rural areas.”); see also Air 
Pol. Variance Bd. v. W. Alfalfa Corp., 416 U.S. 861, 865 (1974). 
James’s alleged trespass onto the Farm’s property occurred 
in the Canal in or near an open field where the Farm grows 
Bermuda grass. R. at 5. Regardless of James’s actual physical 
position, there is no record evidence indicating that James 
entered any building or even the “curtilage,” or immediate 
surroundings, of a building on the Farm’s property. It is 
irrelevant that the Farm posted “No Trespassing” signs along the 
Canal where James allegedly trespassed. R. at 5; Oliver, 466 U.S. 
at 182, n.13 (“Certainly the Framers did not intend that the 
Fourth Amendment should shelter criminal activity wherever 
persons with criminal intent choose to . . . post ‘No Trespassing’ 
signs.”). 
The open fields doctrine accordingly allows for observations 
and photographs like those at issue here to be taken without 
implicating the Fourth Amendment. The Farm simply had no 
legitimate expectation of privacy in its Bermuda grass fields. Any 
member of the public could have photographed the manure 
spreading operations from outside the Farm’s private property—
and even if the Farm’s layout does not allow public viewing, 
anyone would be allowed to take aerial photographs of the Farm’s 
activities without a warrant. See Dow Chem. Co., 476 U.S. at 234. 
James’s observations and photographs are therefore admissible 
because they did not constitute a search under the Fourth 
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Amendment. While the open fields doctrine may even allow for 
admittance of James’s effluent sampling evidence,3 another 
Fourth Amendment exception applies more precisely to that 
evidence. 
2. The effluent sample results are admissible. 
James’s effluent sampling was not a Fourth Amendment 
search because the wastewater was inevitably flowing into a 
freely searchable public waterway. Government inspection of 
items irretrievably flowing into public hands does not constitute 
an unreasonable search. Riverdale Mills Corp. v. Pimpare, 392 
F.3d 55, 64 (1st Cir. 2004) (citing California v. Greenwood, 485 
U.S. 35, 40–41 (1988) (holding that individuals have no legitimate 
expectation of privacy in opaque plastic garbage bags awaiting 
curbside pickup)). Thus, there is no legitimate expectation of 
privacy in wastewater that will “inevitably reach” a public 
waterway, even if the wastewater is sampled on private property 
without consent. Id. 
In Riverdale Mills, the government took effluent samples 
from a manhole on private property against the consent of the 
plaintiff corporation. Id. at 58. The First Circuit reasoned that 
the search was not made improper simply because there was a 
trespass. Id. at 64 (“The contours of the Fourth Amendment are 
not coterminous with property and trespass law.”). The court 
further refused to recognize a legitimate expectation of privacy in 
the plaintiff’s wastewater because it was “irretrievably flowing 
into the public sewer . . . only 300 feet away.” Id. (emphasis in 
original). Like the government in Riverdale Mills, James took 
samples from water flowing irretrievably into a public waterway. 
The wastewater became “irretrievable” as it flowed into the 
Canal. Had James taken the samples downstream where the 
Canal enters the Deep Quod, avoiding the alleged trespass, the 
Farm could not rationally assert a legitimate expectation of 
privacy. It follows that a privacy interest does not arise simply 
 
 3. In United States v. Carasis, 863 F.2d 615, 616–17 (8th Cir. 1988), the 
Eighth Circuit held that officers’ trespass and subsequent sampling of a “dark 
colored waste substance” on private property was not a search because of the 
open fields doctrine. While the case at bar is indistinguishable from Carasis, 
separate Fourth Amendment analysis also supports admission of the effluent 
samples as analyzed in section 2. 
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because James took the samples further up the Canal. 
Accordingly, his effluent sampling was not a Fourth Amendment 
search, and the sample results are admissible. The district court’s 
failure to analyze whether James engaged in a Fourth 
Amendment search in the first instance warrants reversal. 
C.  Even if an unreasonable government search 
occurred, the district court erred in applying the 
exclusionary rule. 
The district court mischaracterized Riverwatcher’s suit and 
misapplied the holdings of its own cited cases; the exclusionary 
rule does not apply in this proceeding. In Smith Steel Casting Co. 
v. Brock, 800 F.2d 1329, 1334 (1986), the Fifth Circuit 
distinguished between an agency that is “correcting violations” 
and one that is “punishing the crime.” See also Trinity Indus., 
Inc. v. OSHRC, 16 F.3d 1455, 1462 (6th Cir. 1994) (recognizing 
same distinction). Citing INS v. Lopez-Mendoza, 486 U.S. 1032, 
1046–47 (1984), the Smith Steel court held that the exclusionary 
rule “does not extend to OSHA enforcement actions for purposes 
of correcting violations of occupational safety and health 
standards.” Id. (emphasis added). Thus, while the exclusionary 
rule does apply to purely punitive agency actions, it does not 
apply when an agency is correcting unlawful behavior. See Lopez-
Mendoza, 468 U.S. at 1047 (“[W]e have never suggested that [an 
unlawful search] allows the criminal to continue in the 
commission of an ongoing crime.”). 
Riverwatcher’s suit against the Farm fits within the 
“correcting violations” category of actions in which the 
exclusionary rule does not apply. The district court erroneously 
based its decision in this action as only one to “collect penalties” 
for CWA violations. R. at 9. However, Riverwatcher seeks 
injunctive relief under CWA § 309(b), 33 U.S.C. § 1319(b) (2012) 
and RCRA § 7002, 42 U.S.C. § 6972 (2012). R. at 7. Riverwatcher 
has therefore sought to correct the Farm’s violations of the CWA 
and RCRA, and allowing the violator to go free on Fourth 
Amendment grounds does not comport with the district court’s 
own case law. The Lopez-Mendoza Court even recognized the 
importance of admitting evidence to stop environmental 
contamination. 468 U.S. at 1046 (“Presumably no one would 
argue that the exclusionary rule should be invoked to prevent an 
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agency from ordering corrective action at a leaking hazardous 
waste dump if the evidence underlying the order had been 
improperly obtained . . . .”). Under the district court’s cited 
authority, the exclusionary rule does not apply to the evidence in 
this suit. For the foregoing reasons, this Court should reverse the 
district court’s decision to exclude the evidence James obtained 
and remand for proceedings consistent with the arguments below. 
III.  THE FARM IS A MEDIUM CAFO SUBJECT TO 
THE CWA’S NPDES PERMITTING 
REQUIREMENTS. 
The Farm is a point source that discharged pollutants into a 
public waterway without a permit. The purpose of the CWA is to 
“restore and maintain the chemical, physical, and biological 
integrity of the Nation’s waters.” 33 U.S.C. § 1251(a) (2012). As 
such, the CWA prohibits any discharge of a pollutant from a point 
source into navigable waters, except in compliance with an 
NPDES permit. 33 U.S.C. §§ 1311(a), 1342, 1362(12). 
Pollution from agricultural feeding operations (AFOs) is a 
leading cause of water quality impairments nationally—confined 
livestock generate over 500 million tons of manure per year 
compared to 150 million tons of waste produced by humans. 2003 
CAFO Rule, 68 Fed. Reg. 7,176, 7,180–81 (Feb. 12, 2003) (to be 
codified at 40 C.F.R. pt. 122) [hereinafter 2003 Rule]. This 
manure includes nitrogen and pathogens that lead to toxic algal 
blooms and contamination of drinking water, causing “blue baby 
syndrome” and intestinal illnesses.4 2003 Rule at 7,237–38. While 
it is important that farms productively reuse their waste, it is 
imperative that regulators protect water quality and human 
health through NPDES permitting. 
The demand for more dairy production for Greek yogurt 
drives an increase in the number of cows on farms, and an 
increase of waste, posing an even greater threat to public waters 
and health. See S. Rep. No. 92-414, at 100 (1972), reprinted in 
 
 4. Nationally, agricultural runoff that flows into the Mississippi River, such 
as the nitrogen from Farmville, causes a large dead zone in the Gulf of Mexico 
resulting in massive fish kills and economic losses. EPA, EPA-822-B-00-002, 
Nutrient Criteria Technical Guidance Manual, Rivers and Streams 5 (2000), 
available at http://perma.cc/KB28-NDXX. 
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1972 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3668, 3761, attached at App. B. Given this 
threat, proper waste management and permitting is critical to 
ensure agricultural waste discharges are monitored and 
controlled. Thus, the CWA addresses the very pollution problems 
the Farm poses, and the district court had no legal basis for 
leaving the Farm unregulated under the CWA. As shown below, 
the Farm meets the statutory definition of a point source as a 
Medium concentrated AFO (CAFO), and its discharge is not 
exempt as agricultural stormwater. 
A.  The Farm meets the statutory definition of a point 
source as a CAFO. 
The CWA prohibits unpermitted point sources from 
discharging pollutants like manure and acid whey waste into 
waters of the United States. The CWA defines a point source as 
any discrete conveyance including a CAFO or ditch “from which 
pollutants are or may be discharged.” 33 U.S.C. § 1362(14).5 For a 
facility to be a CAFO, it must first be an AFO. An AFO is a lot or 
facility where animals are confined for at least forty-five days in a 
twelve-month period, and where vegetation is not grown on any 
part of the facility. 40 C.F.R. § 122.23(a)(1) (2014). It is 
undisputed that the Farm is an AFO, housing dairy cows solely in 
a barn and only maintaining vegetation elsewhere on the Farm’s 
property. R. at 4, 5, 8. 
The Farm is more specifically a medium-sized CAFO. A 
Medium CAFO is an AFO with 200–699 confined mature dairy 
cows and a conveyance condition that facilitates adding animal 
waste to navigable waters. § 122.23(b)(6)(i), (ii). The Farm has 
enough animals to produce a large amount of concentrated waste, 
and the Farm has a conveyance ditch that risks discharging the 
waste. It is undisputed that as of 2010 the Farm sustains a 
milking heard of 350 cows in a barn, which is never pastured. R. 
at 4–5. While the district court correctly held that the Farm is a 
medium AFO, the Farm’s management of these 350 cows also 
falls within the statutory size requirement of a Medium CAFO. R. 
at 8. 
 
 5. All definitions herein defined by regulation are the same for EPA 
administered NPDES programs as well as state administered NPDES programs. 
See 40 C.F.R. § 123.2. 
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In addition to meeting the size requirement, a CAFO must 
have a man-made ditch that discharges pollutants into waters of 
the United States. § 122.23(b)(6)(ii)(A). The Farm maintains at 
least one man-made ditch dug from the property to the Canal. R. 
at 6. On April 12, 2013, this man-made ditch conveyed nitrates 
and fecal coliforms from the Farm’s fields into the Canal. R. at 6. 
Photos, observations, and water samples each document this 
discharge. R. at 6. Agricultural wastes qualify as pollutants 
under the CWA, 33 U.S.C. § 1362(6) and as a tributary to the 
navigable Deep Quod River, r. at 7, the Canal is a water of the 
United States. 33 C.F.R. § 328.3(a)(5) (2014); United States v. 
Edison, 108 F.3d 1336, 1342 (11th Cir. 1997). The discharge of 
nitrates and fecal coliforms into the Canal constitutes the 
addition of pollutants to waters of the United States. The 
existence of the discharging ditch establishes the Farm as a 
Medium CAFO and a regulated point source. Because the district 
court erroneously excluded the evidence of the discharge, it failed 
to properly address whether the Farm is a CAFO, and this Court 
should reverse and remand. 
B.  The Farm’s point source field discharge is not 
exempt as agricultural stormwater. 
As a matter of law, an NPDES permit is required for any 
illicit pollutant drainage from the Farm’s fields after improper 
land application of manure to saturated soil. The CWA prohibits 
discharges of any pollutant from a point source like a Medium 
CAFO without an NPDES permit. 33 U.S.C. § 1342(a)(1); 40 
C.F.R. § 122.23(d)(1). However, there are two regulatory 
provisions that would exempt a CAFO discharge as agricultural 
stormwater. First, pollution is expressly exempt when resulting 
from nonpoint source agricultural activities, including 
stormwater runoff from cultivated crops, unless the discharge is 
from a CAFO. 40 C.F.R. § 122.3(e). The operative word in the 
exemption is stormwater. In 1989, EPA added the word 
stormwater to the regulations, emphasizing that the permit 
exemption is only for stormwater runoff from agricultural fields. 
1989 NPDES Rule, 54 Fed. Reg. 246, 247 (Jan. 4, 1989) (to be 
codified at 40 C.F.R. pt. 122). Second, in 2003, the regulations 
were expanded to include land application discharges in the 
exemption, but only in accordance with an NMP. 2003 Rule at 
19
  
106 PACE ENVIRONMENTAL LAW REVIEW ONLINE [Vol.  6 
7,198; Alt v. EPA, 979 F. Supp. 2d 701, 708 (N.D. W.Va. 2013). 
The Farm’s discharge is not exempt because land application of 
manure is not part of an exempt activity, and because the Farm 
applies its waste improperly, the discharge is not agricultural 
stormwater. 
1. The Farm’s discharge from land application of 
waste is still from a point source. 
The Farm’s manure application to its fields adjacent to the 
barn is not an exempt activity. A CAFO’s management areas 
adjacent to animal production areas, like its fields, are still part 
of the facility and subject to NPDES regulation. Alt, 979 F. Supp. 
2d at 713 (finding land appurtenant to CAFO is included in the 
plain regulatory meaning of facility); see also Waterkeeper 
Alliance, Inc. v. EPA, 399 F.3d 486, 510 (2d Cir. 2005) (finding 
that CAFOs are the proximate source of land application 
discharge). The production area includes the animal confinement 
area, or barn. 40 C.F.R. § 122.23(b)(8). A land application area is 
any land under the control of the operation where manure from 
the production area may be spread. § 122.23(b)(3). These areas 
discharge pollutants, and the “clear intent of Congress . . . [is] to 
insure that the animal wastes produced by CAFOs do not pollute 
the waters of the United States.” 2003 Rule at 7,196; Cmty. Ass’n 
for Restoration of the Env’t v. Sid Koopman Dairy, 54 F. Supp. 2d 
976, 981 (E.D. Wash. 1999). In fact, an estimated ninety percent 
of CAFO-generated manure is land applied and indispensable to 
operations. See Waterkeeper Alliance, 399 F.3d at 510. 
A CAFO is not suddenly exempt simply because it spreads 
this vast amount of waste across its fields. See Concerned Area 
Residents for the Env’t v. Southview Farm, 34 F.3d 114, 122–23 
(2d Cir. 1994). Additionally, the existence of a ditch to collect and 
channelize the manure runoff to navigable waters is “in and of 
itself a point source.” Id. at 118 (noting the broad definition of 
point source). As in Southview Farm, the Farm is a CAFO 
spreading liquid manure across its fields. R. at 5. The Farm also 
has a ditch that collects and conveys the field runoff to the Canal. 
And just as in Southview Farm, observations and photographs 
confirm manure spreading by the Farm and the resulting 
discharge from the point source ditch. It would be incongruous to 
find the Farm is not responsible for its waste runoff simply 
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because its manure was used in agricultural activity adjacent to 
the barn. The Farm is a point source discharging without a 
permit. 
2. The Farm’s discharge resulting from its 
improper NMP is not agricultural stormwater. 
As a matter of law, the Farm’s discharges are not exempt 
from NPDES because the runoff from the fields was a result of 
improper application of manure. Discharges from land application 
areas under the control of a CAFO are only exempt from 
permitting if the land application is conducted in accordance with 
site-specific nutrient management practices, as specified in 40 
C.F.R. § 122.42(e)(1)(vi)–(ix), and the discharge is precipitation-
related. 40 C.F.R. § 122.23(e). These provisions require CAFOs to 
implement NMPs for land application “that ensure appropriate 
agricultural utilization of the nutrients in the manure.” § 
122.42(e)(1)(viii). The exemption is limited to agriculture-related 
discharges not caused by negligence, “but by weather—even when 
those discharges came from . . . point sources.” Alt, 979 F. Supp. 
2d at 714 (citing Waterkeeper Alliance, 399 F.3d at 507). Here, the 
Farm has a site-specific NMP; however, the Farm’s NMP does not 
ensure “appropriate agricultural utilization” of nutrients. 
Appropriate agricultural utilization entails applying proper 
amounts of nutrients at proper times in a way that minimizes 
risk to water quality and human health, and is based on the 
Natural Resources Conservation Service’s (NRCS) practice 
standards and local field technical guides. USDA & EPA, Unified 
National Strategy for Animal Feeding Operations 7, 15 (Mar. 9, 
1999), available at http://perma.cc/M34Y-DRP8; NRCS, 
Conservation Practice Standard, Nutrient Management Code 590 
(Jan. 2012), attached at App. A [hereinafter NRCS PS]. These 
standards are important because “when waste is excessively or 
improperly land-applied, the nutrients contained in the waste 
become pollutants that can and often do run off into adjacent 
waterways.” Waterkeeper Alliance, 399 F.3d at 494 (citing 2003 
Rule at 7,180–81). The NRCS standards require that an NMP 
include practices to maintain the soil pH for crop nutrient use, 
prevent land spreading “when the top 2 inches of soil are 
saturated from rainfall” unless other measures are taken to avoid 
a discharge, and be revised if there are significant changes in 
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animal numbers or management. NRCS PS at 2, 3, 7. An NMP 
must include these best management practices, as well as 
location-specific practices. See 2003 Rule at 7,213–14. 
The district court failed to assess the validity of the Farm’s 
NMP, and until it does so, the NMP cannot shield the Farm from 
CWA liability. The district court failed to consider New Union’s 
specific NMP standards and the local Department of Agriculture 
Field Office Technical Guide to see whether the Farm’s NMP 
ensured that excess nutrient runoff was only stormwater-related. 
EPA also proposed requirements in 2006 that all NMPs be 
reviewed by the agency and by the public. 2006 Waterkeeper 
CAFO Rule, 71 Fed. Reg. 37,744, 37,551 (proposed June 30, 2006) 
(to be codified 40 C.F.R. pt. 122). Neither the New Union 
Department of Agriculture nor the public has reviewed the 
Farm’s NMP for adequacy. R. at 5. Analyzed under the national 
standards, the Farm’s NMP allowed “very poor management” 
that lowered the soil pH. R. at 6. A factual dispute remains 
regarding the extent to which the pH change has affected 
nutrient uptake. Also, the NMP does not prevent applying 
manure in the rain or immediately after a 2-inch rain event while 
the soil is still saturated, r. at 7, and there is no record of revision 
to the NMP after the Farm increased its herd and began adding 
whey to its manure. R. at 5. As evidenced by the discharge in 
April 2013, the Farm’s self-written NMP is not allowing 
“appropriate agricultural utilization” of the nutrients and is 
impacting water quality. R. at 6. Because the land application 
was not conducted in accordance with national standard 
practices, the discharge is not exempt from permitting. The 
district court erred in finding that the Farm’s NMP was sufficient 
for the agricultural stormwater exemption to apply. 
The district court also erred in relying on Alt v. EPA to find 
that the Farm’s land spreading discharge was stormwater runoff. 
In Alt, the Court held that discharges of pollutants from CAFOs 
can be exempt if they remain in place until stormwater conveys 
them into navigable waters. 979 F. Supp. 2d at 711–14 (noting 
that EPA also will not apply the exemption to runoff from within 
the production area). There, feathers and dust from a chicken 
farm blew from the production area into the farmyard, without 
active land application. Id. at 704. Precipitation then washed the 
particles into a navigable river as stormwater. Id. Here, the 
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pollution does more than merely blow out of the barn; the Farm 
actively engages in spreading waste on its fields. R. at 5. The 
Farm’s direct application to saturated fields, possibly while it was 
still raining, resulted in a discharge. As comprehensively 
explained in Alt, the exemption only applies to ordinary 
stormwater and not to discharges resulting from inappropriate 
waste management. As a Medium CAFO, the Farm’s discharge 
from improper land spreading of manure on saturated soil is 
point source pollution as a matter of law. 
IV.  THE DISCHARGE FROM IMPROPER LAND 
APPLICATION IS NOT AGRICULTURAL 
STORMWATER. 
Regardless of the Farm’s status as a CAFO, its discharge 
caused by improper nutrient management practices is still 
subject to NPDES. The discharge requires a permit because it is 
not exempt as agricultural stormwater, and is in direct violation 
of the Farm’s no-discharge status. 
A.  The Farm’s discharge was not caused by 
precipitation. 
The Farm’s discharge of pollutants from rain-saturated fields 
does not factually constitute agricultural stormwater. In addition 
to the exemptions discussed above, the CWA excludes 
agricultural stormwater from the definition of a point source. 33 
U.S.C. § 1362(14). The district court failed to analyze whether the 
Farm’s discharge was factually stormwater before addressing the 
CAFO land spreading provision of the regulations. R. at 9. Under 
proper analysis, the threshold inquiry is whether precipitation 
caused the discharge. Southview Farm, 34 F.3d at 120–121. It is 
not enough to simply show the discharge “occurred during rainfall 
or [was] mixed with rain water run-off.” Id. Thus, discharges 
caused by improper manure spreading on fields are not included 
in this exemption, even if arguably mixed with rainwater. Id. The 
district court failed to consider this factual distinction when 
relying on Alt v. EPA. Again, Alt involved ordinary stormwater 
because the discharge was only caused by precipitation. Here, the 
Farm’s improper land application caused the discharge. 
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The record indicates that the Farm applied manure during or 
immediately after a two-day rain event while the soil was still 
saturated. R. at 6. Moreover, the Farm added acid whey to its 
manure, which prevented the crops from fully utilizing nutrients, 
creating a buildup of excess nutrients on the fields. R. at 5–6. 
Rain would inevitably wash these nutrients into the Canal. 
Pollutants’ mixing with rainwater does not indicate that the 
discharge was caused by precipitation—the discharge was a 
direct result of the Farm’s improper practices. Further, the 
discharge occurred from the Farm’s drainage ditch, a point source 
under the CWA. 33 U.S.C. § 1362(14). Thus, the Farm, even if not 
a CAFO, cannot benefit from the general agricultural stormwater 
exemption. This Court should reverse and remand for proper 
factual analysis. 
B.  The Farm is in violation of its “no-discharge” 
status. 
The Farm’s state-regulated no-discharge status does not 
guarantee there will never be a discharge and requires the Farm 
to seek an NPDES permit once it does discharge. An operation 
“must not discharge unless the discharge is authorized by an 
NPDES permit.” 40 C.F.R. § 122.23(d)(1). EPA may delegate the 
NPDES program to states so long as the state permitting 
programs “apply, and insure compliance with, any applicable 
requirements [of the Act].” 33 U.S.C. § 1342(b). New Union is 
authorized to administer the CWA and has classified the Farm as 
a no-discharge operation. R. at 5. A discharge from the Farm is 
thus in violation of the CWA. 
EPA’s 2003 no-discharge certification, withdrawn and 
replaced with a proposed voluntary no-discharge certification in 
2008, informs the basic tenets of a state no-discharge certification 
and notes that any unpermitted discharge renders the 
certification invalid and in violation of the CWA. 2012 CAFO 
Rule, 77 Fed. Reg. 44,494, 44,495–96 (July 30, 2012) (to be 
codified at 40 C.F.R. pt. 122); 2008 CAFO Rule, 73 Fed. Reg. 
70,418, 70,425 (Nov. 20, 2008) (to be codified at 40 C.F.R. pt. 122); 
2003 Rule at 7,176, 7,203. It is undisputed that on April 12, 2013, 
nitrates and fecal coliforms drained from the Farm’s ditch into 
the Canal. R. at 6. This violates the Farm’s no-discharge status 
and is a point source discharge that requires an NPDES permit. 
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Finally, in addition to the April 2013 discharge, the Farm is 
operating in a manner that will lead to more discharges. R. at 6. 
The CWA requires a permit for point sources that may discharge. 
33 U.S.C. § 1342. Operations may avoid permitting if constructed 
and managed to prevent discharges. See Nat’l Pork Producers 
Council v. EPA, 635 F.3d 738, 749 (5th Cir. 2011). Even though 
EPA may not regulate a facility that has not yet discharged, here 
the Farm has discharged and will discharge again. Id. at 750–51, 
756. An EPA guidance document outlines what is proper 
operation, examining various factors such as proximity to waters 
of the United States and whether an NMP incorporates best 
management practices. EPA, EPA-833-R-10-006, Implementation 
Guidance on CAFO Regulations–CAFOs that Discharge or Are 
Proposing to Discharge 2, 6 (May 28, 2010), available at 
http://perma.cc/2UQ2-D5N2. The Farm is next to the Canal, has a 
drainage ditch connecting its fields to the Canal, and manages 
manure with an improper NMP. Thus, regardless of the Farm’s 
CAFO designation, the Farm operates in violation of its no-
discharge status and requires an NPDES permit. This Court 
should therefore reverse and remand. 
V.   THE ACID WHEY IS A SOLID WASTE AND RCRA’S 
AGRICULTURAL WASTE EXEMPTION DOES NOT 
APPLY. 
RCRA prohibits the open dumping of solid waste. See 42 
U.S.C. § 6945 (2012). Pursuant to its requirement to define open 
dumping, EPA established that practices that do not satisfy “the 
criteria in §§ 257.1 through 257.4 . . . constitute open dumping . . . 
.” 40 C.F.R. § 257.1(a)(1) (2014). Riverwatcher seeks to enforce 
this prohibition against the Farm. See 42 U.S.C. § 6945(a) 
(authorizing citizen suits under RCRA § 7002 to enforce the 
prohibition against open dumping). 
Riverwatcher can prevail on its open dumping claim by 
showing that the Farm disposes solid waste and that its disposal 
practices fail to meet EPA’s criteria. See Parker v. Scrap Metal 
Processors, Inc., 386 F.3d 993, 1013 (11th Cir. 2004); 42 U.S.C. § 
6945(a); 40 C.F.R. § 257.1(a)(2). The district court found that the 
acid whey does not constitute solid waste, and that even if it does, 
RCRA’s agricultural waste exemption applies. This Court should 
reverse because the whey is a solid waste that the Farm disposes 
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of, the agricultural waste exemption does not apply, and the 
district court failed to apply EPA’s criteria to the Farm’s 
practices. 
A.  The acid whey, even when mixed with the manure, 
constitutes a solid waste. 
The district court’s finding that the acid whey does not fit the 
definition of “discarded” in EPA’s hazardous waste regulations, 
40 C.F.R. § 261.2(a)(2)(i) (2014), should not have precluded it 
from also applying broader interpretations of the term for non-
hazardous waste. See Cal. Dep’t of Toxic Substances Control v. 
Interstate Non-Ferrous Corp., 298 F. Supp. 2d 930, 975 (E.D. Cal. 
2003) (noting that since plaintiff did not bring suit under RCRA’s 
hazardous waste sections, RCRA’s broader statutory definition of 
solid waste applied.). Although this definition can aid in 
interpreting “discarded,”6 since Riverwatcher claims that the 
Farm disposes of nonhazardous solid waste, r. at 10, the district 
court erred by ending the inquiry after applying this narrower 
regulatory definition of “discarded material.” 
Broader interpretations of “discarded” include material that 
has been “disposed of, abandoned, or thrown away.” Am. Mining 
Cong. v. EPA (AMC), 824 F.2d 1177, 1193 (D.C. Cir. 1987); Safe 
Air for Everyone v. Meyer, 373 F.3d 1035, 1041 (9th Cir. 2004). As 
such, materials are “discarded” when they constitute part of the 
waste disposal problem. AMC, 824 F.2d at 1186; Safe Food and 
Fertilizer v. EPA, 350 F.3d 1263, 1268 (D.C. Cir. 2003). 
Additionally, material is “discarded” if it has been discarded once, 
regardless of whether other parties reclaim it. United States v. 
ILCO, Inc., 996 F.2d 1126, 1132 (11th Cir. 1993). However, 
materials are not discarded if “they are destined for beneficial 
reuse or recycling in a continuous process by the generating 
industry itself.” AMC, 824 F.2d at 1186; Safe Air, 373 F.3d at 
1043. 
 
 6. Because hazardous waste must first constitute solid waste, any 
interpretation of “discarded” can aid in determining whether RCRA applies. See 
42 U.S.C. § 6903(5) (defining hazardous waste); Water Keeper Alliance v. United 
States Dep’t of Defense, 152 F. Supp. 2d 163, 168 (D.P.R. 2001) (noting that 
where both the regulatory definition and EPA’s Military Munitions Rule contain 
“discarded material,” “any definition of discarded material . . . is instructive”). 
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When Chokos gives the acid whey to the Farm, the whey 
becomes discarded material. ILCO, 996 F.2d at 1132. In ILCO, 
the defendant purchased batteries and recycled the parts. Id. at 
1129. It argued that, because it never discarded these materials, 
they did not constitute “solid waste.” Id. at 1131. The court 
disagreed, finding it “perfectly reasonable” to interpret discarded 
to mean “discarded once.” Id. at 1132. Thus, the parts were solid 
waste because “[s]omebody has discarded the battery in which 
these components are found. This fact [did] not change just 
because a reclaimer has purchased or finds value in the 
components.” Id. at 1131 (emphasis in original). Just as the 
defendant in ILCO could not escape RCRA liability because it 
received waste from others, the Farm cannot escape liability 
simply because it accepted waste from Chokos. When Chokos 
gives its whey to the Farm, it throws away a by-product of its 
production process. Because somebody discarded it, the acid whey 
constitutes solid waste. 
Further, the acid whey does not get beneficially reused in a 
continuous process by the generating industry itself, and it 
represents part of the waste disposal problem. In Safe Air, 
bluegrass growers reused grass residue in a continuous process to 
produce more bluegrass, foreclosing RCRA solid waste liability. 
373 F.3d at 1046; see also Safe Food and Fertilizer, 350 F.3d at 
1268 (“materials destined for future recycling by another industry 
may be considered ‘discarded’ . . . if they can reasonably be 
considered part of the waste disposal problem.” (emphasis in 
original)). Here, the generating industry of the acid whey is 
yogurt production by Chokos, which merely gives the whey to the 
Farm. R. at 5. Further, its use by the Farm is far from beneficial, 
given its effect on the Bermuda grass. See r. at 6. The whey is 
also part of the waste disposal problem. See Justin Elliot, Whey 
Too Much: Greek Yogurt’s Dark Side, Modern Farmer (May 22, 
2013), available at http://perma.cc/CFV4-9BPA (noting that the 
Northeast generated over 150 million gallons of acid whey in a 
year, which cannot “simply be dumped. Not only would that be 
illegal, but whey decomposition is toxic to the natural 
environment”). The whey gets discarded by Chokos, does not get 
beneficially reused in the generating industry’s own process, and 
is part of the waste disposal problem. Thus, it constitutes 
“discarded” material and a solid waste under RCRA. 
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B.  The Farm disposes of acid whey when it applies it 
to its fields with the manure. 
When the Farm spreads the whey on its fields it disposes of 
solid waste because doing so reduces the ability of the Bermuda 
grass to absorb nutrients, and excess nutrients can wash into the 
Canal. R. at 6. RCRA defines “disposal” as the “placing of any 
solid waste . . . on any land . . . so that such solid waste . . . or any 
constituent thereof may enter the environment or be . . . 
discharged into any waters including ground waters.” 42 U.S.C. § 
6903(3). 
In Parker, the defendants operated a scrap metal and 
junkyard, 386 F.3d at 1000, which contained “piles of scrap metal, 
discarded materials . . . and other solid waste.” Id. at 1001 n.5. 
The court stated that, by keeping these materials on their land, 
the defendants “placed solid waste on their property in such a 
manner that the waste could enter the environment.” Id. at 1013. 
The court therefore held that the defendants “disposed of” solid 
waste on their property. Id. 
The Farm spreads the acid whey directly onto its land. R. at 
5. Riverwatcher’s expert believes that “unprocessed nutrients 
were then released into the environment” during rain events. R. 
at 6. The record does not show that the Farm’s expert disputed 
this release. Even if he did, a “disposal” only requires placing 
solid waste on land so that the waste or “constituent thereof may 
enter the environment or be . . . discharged into any waters . . . .” 
42 U.S.C. § 6903(3) (emphasis added). Because the Farm placed 
the mixture on the land and constituents of the mixture, which 
includes acid whey, could enter the environment, the Farm 
disposed of solid waste. This Court should accordingly reverse. 
C.  The district court erred because it applied the 
agricultural waste exemption and did not analyze 
whether the Farm’s practices constitute open 
dumping. 
The district court did not address EPA’s open dumping 
criteria because it found that RCRA’s agricultural waste 
exemption precluded applying them to the Farm’s practices. R. at 
11. As shown below, the agricultural waste exemption does not 
apply, and this Court should remand for the district court to 
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make the fact-specific inquiries required to determine whether 
the Farm’s practices satisfy the criteria. 
Under the agricultural waste exemption, the open dumping 
criteria “do not apply to agricultural wastes, including manures 
and crop residues, returned to the soil as fertilizers or soil 
conditioners.” 40 C.F.R. § 257.1(c)(1). The exemption does not 
apply here for two reasons. First, while the manure gets returned 
to the soil as fertilizer, the acid whey does not come from the 
Farm, so it cannot get “returned” to the Farm’s fields. Second, 
exempting this practice would encourage farms to accept waste 
and add it to manure, regardless of the potential effects, thus 
avoiding RCRA liability. See Safe Air, 373 F.3d at 1050 (Paez, J., 
dissenting) (“According to the majority’s logic, any disposal 
process, no matter how environmentally unsound, would be 
exempted from the reach of RCRA as long as the waste residue 
was eventually returned to the soil.”). Indeed, the Farm’s practice 
of accepting acid whey and applying it to its land causes unsound 
environmental effects. The district court erred in applying the 
exemption. 
Because the exemption does not apply, the district court 
should have addressed whether the Farm’s practices fail to meet 
EPA’s open dumping criteria. Given the fact-specific analysis 
required to analyze the criteria, this Court should reverse and 
remand. 
VI.  THE FARM’S PRACTICES MAY PRESENT AN 
IMMINENT AND SUBSTANTIAL 
ENDANGERMENT TO HEALTH OR THE 
ENVIRONMENT. 
RCRA authorizes citizen suits against any entity that 
contributes to the disposal of solid waste, “which may present an 
imminent and substantial endangerment to health . . . .” 42 
U.S.C. § 6972(a)(1)(B) (emphasis added). A successful 
endangerment claim requires the plaintiff to show that an entity 
contributes to the disposal of solid waste, and that such waste 
may present an endangerment. See Burlington N. & Santa Fe Ry. 
Co. v. Grant (BNSF), 505 F.3d 1013, 1020 (10th Cir. 2007) (citing 
Cox v. City of Dallas, 256 F.3d 281, 292 (5th Cir. 2001)). 
Farmville has a recurring problem of nitrates in its drinking 
water, leading to several nitrate advisories. R. at 7. Because the 
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Farm contributes to the disposal of solid waste that plays a role 
in creating this problem, the district court erred in finding no 
imminent and substantial endangerment. 
A.  The Farm contributes to the disposal of solid waste. 
The fact that one cannot characterize the Farm as the “but-
for” cause of the nitrate advisory is irrelevant to a finding that 
the Farm contributes to the disposal of solid waste. “The relevant 
legislative history supports a broad, rather than a narrow, 
construction of the phrase ‘contributed to.’” United States v. Aceto 
Agric. Chem. Corp., 872 F.2d 1373, 1383 (8th Cir. 1989). Under a 
broad construction, to contribute to the disposal of solid waste the 
defendant must have had “a part or share in producing an effect.” 
Cox, 256 F.3d at 295; see also Parker, 386 F.3d at 1013 (holding 
that defendants “contributed to” disposal of solid waste because 
they placed discarded materials directly onto their property). 
In Cox, the court addressed whether the City of Dallas 
“contributed to” the disposal of solid waste at two dumps. See 256 
F.3d at 288. The City had hired contractors to demolish city 
property, and the contractors disposed of the resulting waste at 
the dumps in question. Id. at 286. Since the City’s waste went 
into the dumps, it had a part or share in producing an effect 
(there, illegal dumping), so it “contributed to” the disposal of solid 
waste. Id. at 297. Other parties had disposed of solid waste at the 
dumps for years before the City’s disposal. Id. at 285. The City 
therefore could not have been the but-for cause, but the court 
affirmed “contributing to” liability against it. Id. at 297. 
Similarly, given the amount of farming in the Deep Quod 
watershed, multiple parties could have contributed to the nitrate 
advisory, including the Farm. See r. at 7. But this does not 
foreclose “contributing to” liability. Even though the Farm may 
not have been the but-for cause of the advisory, it had a part or 
share in producing that effect and thus contributed to the 
disposal of solid waste. As a result, the district court erred in its 
“contributing to” analysis. 
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B.  The Farm’s practices may present an imminent and 
substantial endangerment. 
RCRA’s citizen suit provision subjects to liability anyone who 
contributes to solid waste disposal “which may present an 
imminent and substantial endangerment to health or the 
environment.” 42 U.S.C. § 6972(a)(2)(B). The word “may” 
demonstrates that the Farm’s solid waste disposal need only have 
the possibility of presenting such an endangerment. See Parker, 
386 F.3d at 1015 (“The operative word in the statute is the word 
‘may.’”). The Farm’s practices may present an imminent threat of 
endangerment that is substantial. 
1. The Farm’s practices present an “imminent” 
threat to Farmville residents. 
Demonstrating imminence requires a plaintiff to show that a 
threat presently exists, “although the impact of the threat may 
not be felt until later.” Meghrig v. K.F.C. W., Inc., 516 U.S. 479, 
486 (1996) (quoting Price v. United States Navy, 39 F.3d 1011, 
1019 (9th Cir. 1994)). In Price, the plaintiff failed to present 
sufficient evidence of imminence where the state had cleaned up 
the property in question and placed concrete caps over the side 
yards. 39 F.3d at 1018–20. While the state’s witnesses testified 
that contamination still existed, they also testified that the 
concrete barriers eliminated any present danger. Id. at 1020. In 
all, since the barriers would keep the contamination from 
spreading, the court held that no imminent and substantial 
endangerment existed. See id. 
In the Farm’s case, a threat presently exists which may cause 
an endangerment in the future. The practice of spreading the acid 
whey on the Farm’s fields represents the present threat. The 
potential impact of this threat—excess nutrients washing into the 
Canal and affecting Farmville’s water supply—does not manifest 
itself immediately, but rather after rain events. See r. at 6. The 
Farm has not taken any precautions to prevent nitrates from 
entering the Canal, and the threat posed by the application of 
acid whey to the Farm’s fields exists now, even though the 
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2. The Farm’s practices present a threat of 
“endangerment.” 
With respect to endangerment, a plaintiff need not show 
actual harm, but only a threatened or potential harm. See Parker, 
386 F.3d at 1015; Meghrig, 516 U.S. at 486; United States v. 
Vertac Chem. Corp., 489 F. Supp. 870, 880 (E.D. Ark. 1980). In 
Vertac Chem., there existed “no proof of actual harm sustained 
from the escape of dioxin from the premises of Vertac.” 489 F. 
Supp. at 880. The court, noting the potential health risks posed 
by dioxin, stated, “As much as humanly possible this risk must be 
removed,” and held that “the existence of this risk to the public 
justifies” relief. Id. at 881. 
Like the dioxin in Vertac Chem., nitrates pose a risk to public 
health. High levels of nitrates can make a “municipal water 
supply unsafe for drinking by infants.” R. at 6. The Farm’s 
actions contribute to these nitrate advisories, and thus present a 
threatened or potential harm to infants. Because an 
endangerment claim does not require actual harm, the threat of 
health risk justifies an endangerment finding in this case. 
Further, that parents can avoid actual injury by providing 
bottled water to their infants, r. at 11, has no bearing on an 
endangerment claim. This case is distinguishable from Davies v. 
Nat’l Coop. Refinery Ass’n, relied on by the district court. There, 
the court found that, because the plaintiffs could drink bottled 
water to avoid health risks associated with a relatively stable 
plume of contamination, no imminent and substantial 
endangerment existed. 963 F. Supp. 990, 999 (D. Kan. 1997).7 
However, the court also noted the plaintiffs’ inability to prove 
that “any other persons might be exposed to or ingest the 
contaminated groundwater . . . .” Id. The Davies contamination 
threatened only one private well, and no public water supplies. 
Here, erratic surges of nitrate pollution pose a threat to every 
family in Farmville with an infant under two years old. See r. at 
6. The mere fact that families can avoid injury by providing 
bottled water to infants does not foreclose an endangerment 
 
 7. In Davies, the court abstained from exercising jurisdiction over the case. 
See 963 F. Supp. at 997. As such, its findings with respect to the endangerment 
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finding, because the threat of injury still exists. Thus, the 
nitrates that wash into the Canal threaten human health and 
constitute an endangerment. 
3. The Farm’s practices may cause a “substantial” 
endangerment. 
The fact that nitrate advisories do not threaten adults and 
juveniles does not foreclose a finding that an endangerment is 
substantial, because nitrates make water unsafe for drinking by 
infants. A plaintiff can satisfy the “substantial” requirement by 
showing a “reasonable cause for concern that someone or 
something may be exposed to risk of harm by a release, or 
threatened release . . . in the event remedial action is not taken.” 
BNSF, 505 F.3d at 1021; Sullins v. Exxon/Mobil Corp., 729 F. 
Supp. 2d 1129, 1137 (N.D. Cal. 2010). In Sullins, the court found 
endangerment was substantial even on undeveloped and 
unoccupied land. 729 F. Supp. 2d at 1137. Because the land 
would be developed in the future, someone would be exposed to a 
risk of harm if remedial action were not taken. Id. 
Here, infants have been exposed to a risk of harm during 
each of Farmville’s nitrate advisories. The district court applied 
the incorrect standard for “substantial” when it relied on the fact 
that “nitrates pose no health risks to adults and juveniles.” R. at 
11. Because the Farm’s landspreading reduces the ability of the 
Bermuda grass to absorb nutrients from the manure, rain events 
can cause excess nutrients to wash from the Farm’s fields into the 
Canal. R. at 5–6. Without some type of remedial action, excess 
nutrients could get washed into the Canal after every rain event. 
Because the nutrients expose infants to a risk of harm, the 
Farm’s practices present a substantial endangerment. This Court 
should reverse because the Farm’s practices may present an 
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CONCLUSION 
For the above reasons, Riverwatcher urges this Court to 
reverse the district court’s holdings on all issues and remand for 
further proceedings. The evidence James collected is admissible 
and shows that the Farm is in violation of both the CWA and 
RCRA. These claims require fact-specific analyses that the 
district court failed to make. This Court should reverse and 
remand for proper legal and factual analysis. 
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